If stem cell-based therapies are developed, we will likely confront a difficult problem of justice: for biological reasons alone, the new therapies might benefit only a limited range of patients. In fact, they might benefit primarily white Americans, thereby exacerbating long-standing differences in health and health care.

Misunderstanding of the word mine and its shifting relations to 'pro-attitudes' inspired much of Aristotle's attack on collectivism at Politics 1261B 15ff. Similar misunderstandings contribute to certain criticisms leveled by modern conservatives like Goldwater against 'welfarism', they presuppose confused psychological and ethical doctrines. Thus semantically necessary truths may be misconstrued as entailing contingent propositions about political and economic arrangements. Different confusions about mine and 'pro-attitudes' lend a correspondingly specious aura of certainty to some Platonic and Marxist claims. The ownership model (...) of mine impedes our understanding of men. (shrink)

It is increasingly fashionable to attack McTaggart's arguments about the Unreality of Time with a minimum of attention to what he was trying to establish. Those who have only read his one still famous paper ‘The Unreality of Time’ [III] are too likely to assume from professional philosophers' current counter-arguments that the man was a sceptic with only a single idea in his head, rather than an ingenious, constructive metaphysician. Since so much formal and informal analysis has been directed against (...) so few of McTaggart's comments on Time, and mainly against his destructive claim that the vulgar concept of Time requires as explicans an incoherent ‘A-series’ of becomings with ever-shifted pasts, presents and futures, perhaps it is time to encourage some redirection of analytical assessment to what he was arguing for. I say this not only for historical reasons, though I shall draw historical comparisons, but because rationally assessing what McTaggart really denies about Time may require some serious interest in what he so interestingly asserts about our experience of what we call ‘Time’. Trousers, pace Austin, normally have one wearer but two legs. If McTaggart's negative points deserve such a plethora of analysis, then the positive view needs attention or the analysis is ill-aimed. (shrink)

In some practical uncertain situations decision makers are presented with described events that are out of sequence when having to make a causal attribution. A theoretical perspective concerning the causal coherence of the explanation is developed to predict the effect of this on causal attribution. Three experiments investigated the effect on causal judgement when the described order of events did not correspond to their causal order. Participants had to judge the relative probability of two possible causes of an outcome in (...) scenarios in which presentation order varied. All three experiments found that there was a preference to judge that the cause associated with events described in causal order was more responsible for the outcome when events associated with one cause were interleaved in their presentation order with those from a second cause. This occurred when there was a strong causal relationship between events. The results were consistent with the causal coherence explanation. (shrink)

Man an Organic Community - Vol. 1 is an unchanged, high-quality reprint of the original edition of 1893. Hansebooks is editor of the literature on different topic areas such as research and science, travel and expeditions, cooking and nutrition, medicine, and other genres. As a publisher we focus on the preservation of historical literature. Many works of historical writers and scientists are available today as antiques only. Hansebooks newly publishes these books and contributes to the preservation of literature which has (...) become rare and historical knowledge for the future. (shrink)

HUME AND NOWELL-SMITH TRIED TO UNDERSTAND CERTAIN THEOLOGIANS’ CLAIMS ABOUT MIRACLES WITHOUT ATTENDING TO THEIR BASES IN ARISTOTELIAN PHYSICS. THIS SOMEWHAT WEAKENS THEIR CRITICISMS. AFTER REJECTING A "DEMONSTRATIVE" OR "DEDUCTIVE" APPROACH TO MIRACLES WHICH RESULTS FROM CERTAIN (OUT-DATED) ARISTOTELIAN BELIEFS ABOUT SCIENTIFIC REASONING, I ARGUE FOR THE INTELLIGIBILITY AND RATIONALITY OF A TOLERANT ’GOOD REASONS’ APPROACH TO JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE MIRACULOUS. SOME, NOT ALL, OF TILLICH’S REMARKS ON MIRACLES TEND TO FIT THE LATTER APPROACH WHICH LEADS TO AN ILLUMINATING CLUSTER (...) CONCEPT OF "THE MIRACULOUS" (SACRED AND PROFANE). (shrink)

2. Regimentation in Action. That these words of Quine's are unfortunate can best be shown by looking at two examples of regimentation in action and by considering how we might very naturally first appraise the regimenter's success with a metaphysical problem. One example will be taken from Paul Weiss's Modes of Being and the other from Quine himself.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE ACTUAL INFINITE IN ARISTOTLE Prolegomena: Philosophy and Theology Related HENEVER PHILOSOPHY is taken to be the handmaiden of theology, then the autonomy of reason is destroyed." Such a daim should be distinguished from a still 1stronger thesis. Compare: " A philosopher may not legitimately try to fortify an argument by bringing in new premises from another discipline which has a special aura of authority." Quite how Aristotle would (...) have reacted to the first generalization, if it had been suitably translated for his scrutiny, is a question on which commentators might agree to differ. But Aristotle would have been as!'eluctant as Aquinas, or Maimonides, or later Monotheists who treasured the Physics, to leave the second general claim unquestioned. Natural and revealed theology, like physics or mathematics, are domains where extremely subtle reasoner1s have studied and published widely for a very long time. So an elementary respect for induction suggests that philosophers should e:x;pect to benefit from,applying some premises and some ways of arguing, which are found in theology, to their own issues. I speak of premises and ways of arguing that philosophers qua philosophers have not provided before. Thinkers in all four disciplines could thus profit from each body of work. Even the law of averages is set pitilessly against the second general claim.1 1 The late Father F. C. Copleston, S.J., covers many important topics regarding theology and philosophy in Aquinets (Baltimore: Peng11in, 1955), pp. 12-14, 19, 54-63, 65-68, 74, 116, etc. But the point put forward here about human power to strengthen intuition in one field seems to be partly missed. Copleston also fails to dwell enough on infinity in various passages. See John King-Farlow, "The First ·way in Physical and Moral Space", The Thomist 427 428 JOHN KING-FARLOW By focussing on some arguments of Aristotle's against the admissibility of an,actual infinite, we shall find deeper, less obvims reasons for rejecting that second claim. Other philosophical points of intrinsic value should emerge as well foom the short investigation. But this one is especially interesting because of its curious pertinence to perennial disagreements among those who address the relations of theology, theism and philosophy. At any rate, the search for such deeper reasons will involve the application to Aristotle's texts of a somewhat modern way of using the term " intuition ". Introduotion: A Relevant Kind of Intuitive Thinking Diss,atisfaction with modern Platonism in higher mathematics may be added to disenchantment with Platonism's modern opponents. Such opposition may seem too technical for issues of intuition or, indeed, of common reason. And so one is led back to consider certain rightly famous arguments of Aristotle. But before turning to Aristotle and his grapplings with ideais and claims about an actual infinity, let us 1ook at a few very ordinary uses of the sometimes charismatic word "intuition." Webster's Dictionary (1978) offers: "immediate and instinctive perception of a truth; direct understanding without reasoning." In his classic study Evolution of JJ;Jathematieal Concepts, Wilder writes at least once in the spirit of Webster: "Counting with fingers (and toes) clearly involves intuitive recognition of (1-1)-correspontreme, excessive gene:msity, and, next, irion unwillingness to give ·anything to others, lies usually much closer to the first extreme. Between utter recklessness and self-paralyzing caution the Mean may oscillate in relative distance, according to the demands of the context. Near recklessness may offer the only means to win one kind of battle and a stubborn refusal to move may be needed for the nex>t victory. By pursuing such a nonmechanical and variably positioned ideal of a Mean, a really wise father usually oould show special favor to one specially deserving child in some ways and some contexts, yet generally show very satisfying love to a;ll his children. 11 Richard Bosley, " What Is a Mean? The Question Considered Compara· tively and Systematically." PhiloB. (shrink)

By exploring which Fathers interested Newman most and when, using both published and archive material, Benjamin J. King demonstrates the influence of the..

Debate continues to rage among philosophers of religion over Anthony Flew's famous little paper ‘Theology and Falsification’ and the responses it provoked, most notably R. M. Hare's response that religious claims are in no way like scientific hypotheses. For now, twenty years later, we still find many theists taking a similar tack to Hare's. A particularly interesting example is J. F. Miller in Religious Studies, 1969, who replies to Flew that propositions like ‘God loves mankind’ cannot be subject to falsifiability (...) conditions because they are used as claims expressing ‘religious first-order principles of the Judaeo-Christian Weltanschauung and as such are not amenable to falsification’ (p. 50). Miller seems to put his faith in some kind of great gulf fixed between what he would consider decently falsifiable scientific hypotheses and what he takes to be unfalsifiable first-order principles both of theology and of contemporary science. In what follows we will try to sketch a more rational strategy for modern believers of a liberal empiricist type, for those whose interest in appealing and deferring to experience includes but is not restricted to so-called ‘sense experience’. This will involve accepting analogies between theological statements and so-called hypotheses, insofar as the latter are propositions held and put forward in a somewhat tentative spirit with a view to explaining what we experience. (shrink)

AT LEAST ONE MODEL OF THE RATIONAL RELIGIOUS BELIEVER EXISTS: PRIMARY COMMITMENT TO DISCOVERING TRUTH AND ACTING RIGHTLY; COMMITMENT TO A RELIGION FLOWING FROM THOSE PRIMARY ONES; SOME DEGREE OF TENTATIVENESS ABOUT FAITH; SEARCHING FOR PROBABILITY, MORE THAN CERTAINTY; FAITH CONSTITUTING A PARTLY MORAL WAGER AIMED AT MAXIMIZING EXPECTED UTILITIES OF CERTAIN KINDS; A TOLERANT WISDOM ABOUT COMMITMENTS (AND ORDERINGS) PARTLY PLEASING TO SUCH SECULAR THINKERS AS MILL, QUINE AND POPPER, ALSO AQUINAS, BARTLEY AND WILLIAM JAMES; PRIMARY LOVE FOR GOD (...) AS THE SUPREME JUSTIFIER OF HUMAN JUSTIFIER OF HUMAN HISTORY--GOD’S POWER BEING TREATED AS SECONDARY TO HIS GOODNESS. (TOPICS INCLUDE: MIRACLES, IS AND OUGHT, PROBABILITY, WAGERS, PROOFS, TIME, WAR). (shrink)

This paper will attempt to integrate (1) some new reflections on the implications for ontology of Monistic interpretations of formulae in quantification theory, with (2) a review of earlier material that I have published on such implications, and with (3) a sketch of several points made by others which bear on related issues. I hope that a review of these moves and issues might indirectly help the reader in dealing with two strange questions. (A) Does the development of modern quantification (...) theory with its ways of systematically formalising relational inferences throwany light on Ontology, on the question of What There Is for scientists and applied mathematicians to study? (B) Are there any analogies between Monist interpretations of quantification theory and the attraction of holding down the number of basic entities in physics by viewing some as mere modes of other more ‘really basic’ ones? More directly I try to throw sympathetic light on more traditional philosophers of science like Leibniz and Spinoza. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS I05 1120a): these and much else form models of the meticulousness and also the daring with which such discussions should be conducted. THOMAS G. ROSENMEYER University of Washington Religious Philosophy, A Group ol Essays.By Harry Austryn Wolfson. (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1961. Pp. xii + 278. $6.00.) For those who have never dared to take the plunge into one of Professor Wolfson's massive studies--the two-volume sets (...) on Philo and Spinoza, for instance, or the first part of The Philosophy of the Church Fathers--these ten essays offer a series of brief but enlightening introductory paddles. The eleventh piece, a concluding Sermonette, is neither enlightening nor a happy introduction to a rigorous mind. The essays, ranging over a considerable number of Jewish, Christian, Muslim, and secular thinkers, are entitled as follows: "The Philonic God of Revelation and His Latter-day Deniers"; "Extradeical and Intradeical Interpretations of Platonic Ideas"; "Immortality and Resurrection in the Philosophy of the Church Fathers"; "Philosophical Implications of the Theology of Cyril of Jerusalem"; "Philosophical Implications of Arianism and Apollinarianism"; "Saint Augustine and the Pelagian Controversy"; "Ibn Khaldun on Attributes and Predestination "; "Causality and Freedom in Descartes, Leibniz, and Hume"; "The Veracity of Scripture from Philo to Spinoza"; "Spinoza and the Religion of the Past." Despite this wide variety of topics, the book is held together, Wolfson assures us, by a "common theme" (p. v). To accept this theme is, in effect, to look at the history of Western religious philosophy from New Testament times to Spinoza's in a very special way. Picking up three histories of philosophy at random, I find that Bertrand Russell's History of Western Philosophy mentions the Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria (20? mC.--A.D. 54?) on two pages; B. A. G. Fuller's History of Philosophy devotes about three and a half pages to Philo but concludes that "Philo seems to have had no disciples of note and no direct influence, at any rate, upon the century and a half that intervenes between his death and the birth of Plotinus" (p. 305); W. T. Jones in his History of Western Philosophy (Vol. I) rates Philo's worth at just over a page and a caustic footnote. If, however, we look at religious philosophy in Wolfson's way, we see Philo as the root and determining origin of all medieval philosophizing, Jewish, Christian and Muslim ; we further see the medieval philosophy begun by Philo as a homogeneous system of thought, lying between pagan Greek speculations and the secular systems of the seventeenth century. Wolfson writes: 106 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Ostensibly Philo is only the interpreter of the Hebrew Scriptures in terms of Greek philosophy. But actually he is more than that. He is the interpreter of Greek philosophy in terms of certain fundamental teachings of his Hebrew Scripture, whereby he revolutionised philosophy and remade it into what became the common philosophy of the three religions with cognate Scriptures, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (p. v). In all the essays the topics are taken partly as Philonic in origin; it is Wolfson's aim to make the quarrels of medieval and later thinkers more intelligible in the light of their positions' intellectual ancestry. The result of his approach is a series of amazingly dexterous historical investigations; the reader moves with quite unexpected ease through intricate thirty-page discussions, each carrying some hundred or so footnotes of far-flung references to Plato, Aristotle, Scripture, Jewish and Arabic commentators, Patristic hagglers, Spinoza, Hume, Mill, et alii. The burden of erudition is wielded with simplicity and grace. Where there are historical obscurities and misunderstandings to be cleared up, one reads Wolfson with gratitude and enjoyment. Perhaps I can best fulfill my role as reviewer by summarizing part of his sixth and most exciting chapter, that on the controversy of Pelagius and Augustine over human freedom. Here Wolfson sets out to reverse history's verdict: to show Pelagius' account of freedom as keeping to "the original Christian belief"; to show Augustine's views as heretical by the measure of previous Christian tradition. He begins with much-documented observations that Greek pagan philosophy establishes a tension in man between the powers of... (shrink)